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1. Introduction 
Even amidst the renaissance of Aristotelian studies in the past fifty 
years or so, the Politics has attracted less philosophical attention than the 
Nicomachean Ethics.  The reason for this disparity is not far to seek: the 
Politics seems significantly more culture-bound than the Ethics, and so less 
relevant to life in modern, pluralistic nation-states than in pre-modern, 
culturally homogeneous city-states.  Hence even those who have invoked 
Aristotle to critique the dominant modes of modern political thought and 
practice have tended to focus on the Ethics, drawing from the Politics only a 
few ideas about human beings as naturally political animals and justice as the 
common good.  The Ethics, it is widely held, continues to speak to us in 
detail, but the Politics has less to teach us.  In the third and final installment in 
his study of Aristotle’ practical philosophy, Eugene Garver seeks to reverse 
this conventional judgment.
1
  The previous volume maintained that the central 
ideas of the Ethics are more foreign and less attractive than often supposed.  
The book under review, which can be read independently of the others, argues 
that the Politics remains valuable for us today precisely because the many 
glaring differences between Aristotle’s world and our own help us “better to 
see ourselves by contrast” (p. 16).  Garver explores frequently overlooked 
tensions in the work and refuses to accept easy solutions, but he keeps his 
sights set on how reading Aristotle “can help us think through our own 
problems” (p. 14). The result is a challenging and refreshingly distinctive 
treatment of the Politics.  I will argue that several of Garver’s main claims are 
mistaken as interpretations of Aristotle, and I will suggest that the Politics has 
at least as much perennial relevance on the more orthodox interpretation I 
prefer as on Garver’s alternative.  Nonetheless, though this book ought to 
arouse disagreement in any thoughtful reader of Aristotle, it consistently 
                                                          
1 Eugene Garver, Aristotle’s Politics: Living Well and Living Together (Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press, 2012).  His earlier books are Aristotle’s Rhetoric: An Art 
of Character (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1994) and Confronting 
Aristotle’s Ethics: Ancient and Modern Morality (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago 
Press, 2006). 
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provokes a reassessment and clarification of one’s own views.  Anyone with a 
serious interest in Aristotle’s practical philosophy will therefore benefit from 
reading it.  
 
2. Overview of Aristotle’s Politics 
One of the central questions that animates the book is how political 
philosophy can be practical.  How, that is, can abstract theorizing about how 
people might best live together provide any guidance to concrete, particular 
political action?  One possibility is suggested by a plausible interpretation of 
what the Ethics says about practical wisdom (phronēsis): the task of practical 
philosophy is to achieve an articulated understanding of the best way of life 
for human beings, and the task of practical wisdom is to bring that 
understanding to bear on the often bewilderingly complex circumstances of 
action.  On this view, there is a considerable gap between practical philosophy 
and practical deliberation.  Because of this gap, and because much of the task 
of living well is a matter of acquiring virtues of character through the 
habituation and training of our non-rational desires, practical philosophy has a 
limited role in living well.  Even if a philosophical understanding of the good 
is necessary for living well, it will tell us very little about what we should do 
and it will not do much to enable us to do it; for that, we will need the virtues 
of character and practical wisdom.  Since Aristotle tells us that political 
expertise (politikē) and practical wisdom are the same disposition (NE VI.8, 
1141b23-24), we might expect a parallel account of the relationship between 
political philosophy and political action.  Yet, as Garver emphasizes, this is 
not at all what we find in the Politics.   
Instead, Aristotle lays out a program for what political expertise 
should be able to do: it should be able to give an account not only of the 
political arrangement or “constitution” (politeia) that is absolutely best 
without qualification, but also of the arrangement that is best suited to most 
communities in most circumstances, of the arrangements that are best for 
certain kinds of communities in certain kinds of circumstances, and even of 
the arrangement best suited to any given goal, whether or not it is the best 
achievable in the circumstances (Pol. IV.1, 1288b10-39).  Each of these “four 
kinds of best” (p. 4) is the focus of a distinct mode of inquiry that approaches 
politics from the perspective of one of Aristotle’s four causes: inquiry into the 
best without qualification is oriented toward the final cause of politics; inquiry 
into the best possible in specific circumstances begins with the material cause 
and “organizes political inquiry around the best that can be made out of given 
material”; identifying the best constitution suited to most communities 
requires understanding “a formal cause that can organize almost any material, 
any kind of people”; and the study of what Aristotle calls the best “relative to 
a hypothesis” is the search for the efficient causes that will promote any 
posited goal (p. 6).  The Ethics seems to restrict its vision to the best life 
without qualification, offering no account of what is best for most people, 
what is best under specific circumstances, or what will promote any given 
aims.  Practical wisdom may enable its possessor to deliberate well about all 
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of these questions, but it is evidently not the task of practical philosophy to 
answer them.  Hence, Garver concludes, political philosophy is more practical 
than ethics, because it does not need to leave so much to the discretion of 
practical wisdom.  Political philosophy has more guidance to offer the 
statesman than ethics has to offer us as individuals. 
This division of political philosophy into four kinds of inquiry that 
study four kinds of “best” is fundamental to Garver’s reading of the Politics.  
He observes that each of these four approaches has been prominently treated 
as the self-sufficient method of political theorizing.  His examples are “the 
utopian or Platonic best, . . .  the strategic Machiavellian best on a hypothesis, 
. . . the Federalist project of a stable constitution without reliance on virtuous 
politicians, and the approach exemplified by Montesquieu of arguing that 
different peoples are suited to different kinds of government” (p. 7).  One of 
Aristotle’s strengths is that he not only finds a place for all of these inquiries, 
but allows each to complement the others, yielding “a more complete 
understanding” (p. 8).  So for Aristotle the study of how to preserve any given 
sort of political regime is not the amoral enterprise that it is for Machiavelli, 
because the best means of preserving even the most corrupt regime is to 
moderate its excesses to bring it as close as possible to promoting the common 
good.  So too, Aristotle’s best constitution avoids the practical irrelevance of 
much utopian theorizing because it enables us to see the connection between 
the absolute best and the other kinds of best.  Instead of leading us to regard 
non-ideal politics as a disappointing failure to achieve the ideal, the 
integration of utopian theorizing into a more comprehensive philosophy 
enables us to understand “what is truly political about our ordinary political 
activity” (p. 212).  
In his conclusion, Garver lays out five “themes” that he sees 
recurring in the Politics, each of which is “a different way of exploring the 
complex interrelations between ethics and politics, between living well and 
living together” and which is also a way “of connecting Aristotle’s political 
problems to our own”  (p. 214).  Though this summary is placed at the end of 
the book, it can be recommended as a second introduction, since it serves well 
to illustrate the unity of the preceding six chapters.  Each of the themes is a set 
of questions.  The first is: What is the alternative to living as a political 
animal?  As Aristotle has it, every human being who is not radically disabled 
is such as to flourish fully only in political community.  Yet many people who 
are not radically disabled do not live in political communities.  What are the 
alternatives that they prefer instead?  The second, related, theme is: What is so 
fulfilling about expressing one’s nature as a political animal?  What is 
valuable about ruling and being ruled in turn instead of opting for one of the 
alternatives?  Those alternatives are despotism and slavishness, ruling others 
as though they were slaves or living like a slave by preferring pleasure and 
wealth to what is truly good.  Garver’s Aristotle does not believe that his 
audience will be tempted by slavishness, but he does think that despotism is a 
serious problem for them.  For those of us living in advanced capitalist 
societies, however, the problem is, Garver thinks, precisely reversed.  As he 
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puts it, “people engaged in trade and moneymaking try to please their 
customers, and so choose the pleasant over what is truly good. . . . [P]eople 
who organize their lives around acquiring wealth are slavish, even if not 
slaves, because to aim at wealth is to aim at satisfying the ends of people other 
than oneself” (p. 22).   
But if we are to reject slavishness, why should we prefer sharing in 
rule with others over ruling them despotically?  As Garver sees it, Aristotle’s 
answer to this question varies along with the perspective he takes on politics 
in different modes of inquiry.  At times it seems that people’s de facto 
equality makes permanent rule impractical; at others, it is that no single 
individual is sufficiently virtuous to rule well.  Often, most citizens are not 
virtuous enough to want to rule and be ruled in turn for its own sake.  In that 
case, Aristotle argues that the middle class, lacking the vices induced by 
poverty and excessive wealth, will be virtuous enough to be willing to rule 
without wanting to rule permanently; in non-ideal constitutions, citizens can 
be brought to regard a system of shared rule as a way of sharing the burdens 
of sustaining the conditions that enable them to pursue their own private good.  
Fully virtuous people see ruling and being ruled as choiceworthy for its own 
sake, because they see that “ruling over equals is a better, a more fulfilling, 
activity than ruling over unequals” (p. 189).  Since virtue must sustain the 
conditions that enable its successful expression, the virtuous person who 
values ruling over equals will rule in a way that preserves rather than 
undermines his equality with others, and so will allow them to rule in turn 
without seeing this as a loss or sacrifice on his part.  But only the fully 
virtuous can adopt this point of view consistently and make it authoritative 
over their action, and the widespread achievement of this degree of virtue by 
citizens requires the shared system of moral education that Aristotle 
recommends only when he operates in utopian mode.  The ideal of political 
rule as a good in itself is therefore of less practical import than many have 
thought, since Aristotle’s utopian designs are not presented as a model that we 
should seek to approximate in non-ideal conditions, and the Aristotelian 
statesman will not aim to inculcate this kind of virtue in his citizens (p. 204).  
Yet the ideal retains a crucial practical dimension, because shared rule over 
equals is a key component of success in even the least optimal political 
conditions, and the ideal serves to remind us that political rule is noble and 
good even in such circumstances.   
Questions about the value of political rule raise further questions 
about the relationship between the virtues that make a good human being and 
those that make a good citizen.  Those questions are the focus of Garver’s 
fourth theme, and answering them is complicated by the issues raised in his 
third, namely, why is there a plurality of constitutions, even of good 
constitutions?  Garver’s Aristotle does not fit the standard view of the 
difference between modern liberal thought and ancient political philosophy.  
On the standard view, ancient political philosophers endorsed a single 
conception of the good and saw the task of politics as promoting the good so 
conceived.  Liberal theories, by contrast, prioritize the right over the good and 
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search for a single political solution to problems posed by the plurality of 
reasonable conceptions of the good. On Garver’s view, Aristotle’s approach is 
straightforwardly perfectionist only in Books VII-VIII, which take up the 
inquiry into the absolute best.  The other modes of inquiry do not attempt to 
approximate the absolute best, and in fact do not require any detailed 
knowledge of the good life.  The theory of political justice in Book III does 
not appeal to any substantive conception of the good, and so makes the right 
prior to the good.  One of the Politics’s greatest achievements is its discovery 
that constitutions can be better than their citizens, so that political excellence 
does not depend on moral excellence.  Aristotle’s sensitivity to the 
requirements of stability and his concern to identify the best political 
arrangement that is actually possible for most existing communities lead him 
to develop constitutional proposals that anticipate modern liberalism by 
producing “a full separation of ethics and politics” (p. 219).   
But Garver’s Aristotle is not a modern liberal in ancient disguise.  In 
particular, his conception of political justice is considerably narrower than 
most moderns would accept, and he gives it a much smaller role.  In politics, 
justice is strictly a matter of the distribution of offices, and not of honors or 
wealth: “justice is concerned with how rulers are selected, not what they do 
once they are ruling” (p. 124).  The most important virtue for rulers is not 
justice, but moderation.  Unlike the sophrosynē of the Ethics, which governs 
bodily appetites, political moderation consists in countering the tendency 
toward destabilizing extremism among people with partial conceptions of 
justice.  One of the book’s most insightful passages is Garver’s discussion of 
how political leaders can practice moderation without presenting the 
appearance of weakness and compromise.  He cites an unexpected analogy: 
Jackie Robinson’s success in making it apparent that his refusal to retaliate 
against racially motivated insults and abuse was not an expression of 
cowardice, but of courage and self-restraint (p. 154).  Similarly, the successful 
statesman must work to make his concern for stability appear to others as the 
noble commitment to political friendship and harmony that it is.  
Garver’s final theme is the pervasive concern with which I began: 
How can political philosophy be practical?  On the one hand, the book’s 
detailed exploration of Aristotle’s four modes of political inquiry answers that 
question in a variety of ways.  On the other, Garver ends on a more 
pessimistic note, suggesting that the practicality of political philosophy is 
inversely proportional to the value and importance of politics: “If politics is 
about winning, or about coordination, maybe things will be predictable 
enough for there to be a science.  But if politics has something to do with 
living a good life, political philosophy making a practical contribution to our 
lives will be far more difficult.  Only at a few critical places does Aristotle 
promise that political philosophy will tell the statesman something that he 
doesn’t already know” (p. 229).  It might be tempting to respond to this 
depressing prognosis with an appeal to the intrinsic value of philosophical 
understanding.  But Aristotle insists that practical philosophy is supposed to 
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make a difference to how we live our lives.  Can it do that even if Garver is 
right about its limited prospects for effecting political change?  
 
3. Assessment of Aristotle’s Politics 
There is much to disagree with in Garver’s interpretation of Aristotle 
and his relationship to modern politics.  Since a catalogue of disagreements 
would be nearly as long as the book itself and of interest mainly to specialists, 
I will concentrate instead on four broad, related claims: (1) that only the 
inquiry into the best constitution makes the good prior to the right; (2) that 
justice is given virtually no place in Books II, VII, and VIII, while the central 
books concentrate only on a narrow conception of justice; (3) that an 
understanding of the good life is only politically relevant in the best 
constitution; and (4) that the best constitution is in no way a model for 
approximation.  I take all four of these claims to be false; seeing why they are 
false will shed some light on how political philosophy can be practical.   
 Aristotle’s discussions of justice in the Politics explicitly depend on 
the broader theory laid out in Nicomachean Ethics V.  That text is sometimes 
obscure, but the main lines of the theory are clear enough.  Aristotle 
distinguishes between what he calls justice as lawfulness and justice as 
equality or fairness.  Justice as equality admits of further divisions into justice 
in the distribution of goods, the rectification of wrongs, and reciprocity in 
exchange.  Justice as equality is a part of justice as lawfulness, but not the 
whole.  “Lawfulness” misleadingly suggests adherence to positive law, but the 
central idea of justice as lawfulness is instead the promotion and preservation 
of the common good.
2
  There is a common good in every community, from 
the simplest exchange of commodities to the polis itself, but because the 
political community embraces and controls all other forms of community, the 
political common good is paradigmatic.  The polis has this special status not 
because it is the largest form of community or because it is not a part of any 
other community (neither is true), but because a political community is 
essentially one that aims at the well-being or flourishing of its members, and 
this goal is necessarily superordinate to all others.  Good political 
communities promote the flourishing of their members well, and in particular 
promote the good of all of their members without compelling some to serve 
the interests of others without receiving proportionate benefit in return.  As 
Aristotle pithily puts it, “the political good is justice, and this is the common 
good” (III.12 1282b16-17).   
 Strictly speaking, then, Aristotle cannot coherently make the right 
prior to the good.  Discussion of justice is always discussion of the common 
                                                          
2 There are many interpretive disputes about the relationships among these varieties of 
justice, but my argument here does not depend on any particular view of those 
relationships.  I here follow, in broad outline, Fred D. Miller, Jr., Nature, Justice, and 
Rights in Aristotle’s Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), chap. 3, and 
Richard Kraut, Aristotle: Political Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002), chap. 5.   
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good, and discussion of justice in politics is discussion of what promotes and 
protects the shared pursuit of the good life.  Of course, it is arguably 
incoherent to suppose that the right could be prior to the good in the sense of 
not depending on the good for its content and justification.  Presumably, 
Garver does not intend to deny the formal priority of the good to the right, but 
instead to maintain that Aristotle reaches substantive conclusions about justice 
without relying on substantive premises about the good.  In his favor, such 
substantive premises are not prominent outside of Books VII and VIII, and yet 
the conclusions about justice that Aristotle reaches are not merely formal.  But 
those conclusions do in fact inherit the abstract and schematic character of the 
conception of the good on which they depend, and Aristotle’s arguments help 
themselves to substantive premises about the good more often than may 
initially be apparent.   
The central argument of the second half of Book III is that justice 
requires that political offices be distributed according to merit rightly 
conceived.  The meritocratic conception of justice is opposed to what Aristotle 
calls the democratic and oligarchic conceptions.  The democratic conception 
assigns authority equally to all citizens on the grounds that they are all equally 
free, while the oligarchic conception awards offices unequally on the basis of 
wealth (III.9, 1280a7-25).  Aristotle agrees that freedom and even wealth are 
relevant grounds for sharing in authority, but only insofar as they contribute to 
the common good.  Since the virtues of practical wisdom and justice make a 
more decisive contribution, they are the most important determinants of merit 
in the context of politics (III.9, 1281a2-10, 12-13 1283a14-42).  Individuals 
and groups merit permanently preeminent positions of authority only if they 
are better able to promote the common good of the city than any other group 
would be.  Hence a narrow aristocracy or even a monarchy can be just, but 
only if the monarch or the aristocrats meet this rather stringent criterion 
(III.13, 1284a3-8, 17 1287b41-1288a6).   
This argument, so far as it goes, does not depend on any view of the 
content of the common good.  Garver therefore has grounds for claiming that 
the argument operates in abstraction from the good.  But abstraction is not 
isolation or separation.  What we get is not a complete theory of justice, but a 
framework for assessing claims about justice in specific circumstances.  
Actual assessment will depend on a more robust understanding of the content 
of the common good.  Moreover, Aristotle explains mistaken conceptions of 
justice as products of mistaken views about that content.  Democracy treats 
freedom, and oligarchy wealth, as the primary goal of politics.  These views of 
the goal depend for their plausibility on widely shared conceptions of the good 
that give pride of place to pleasure, luxury, and “doing what one wants.”  
(III.9, 1280a6-28; cf. V.10, 1311a8-15, VI.2, 1317a40-b16).  Aristotle rejects 
the democratic and oligarchic views of justice because he rejects the 
conceptions of the good on which they depend.  His own alternative is vague, 
but determinate enough to rule out his rivals.  His theory of justice therefore 
depends on a substantive and controversial conception of the good.    
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 If Garver unduly minimizes the role of the good in Book III, he 
likewise understates the role of justice in Books VII-VIII.  It is true that 
distributive justice is not prominent there, because the best constitution will 
successfully educate its citizens for virtue, and so they will all alternate in 
ruling equally.  But distributive justice is only one part of justice as 
lawfulness, and appeals to virtues other than distributive justice do not imply 
that justice in that broader sense has fallen out of consideration.  Justice as 
lawfulness covers all of the virtues in their other-regarding aspects, so that 
when Aristotle discusses moderation and generosity as the virtues concerned 
with property, he should not be understood as maintaining that property falls 
outside the scope of justice.  The distribution of property in the best 
constitution is one of the main concerns of Book VII, which argues that land 
ownership should be equal and that each citizen should own one plot of land 
near the center of the city and another near the borders, because by this 
arrangement the dangers of military invasion will be more equitably spread 
among the citizens (VII.10, 1330a9-24).  Similarly, Book II argues in favor of 
private property on the grounds that private ownership will better support the 
citizens’ virtue and produce more beneficial results (II.5, 1262b37-1264a5).   
Garver is right to emphasize that these are not considerations of 
distributive justice.  Aristotle evidently does not regard the assessment of 
existing property distributions in terms of distributive justice as a fruitful task 
for political philosophy.  His reason for this is not obvious, but here is a 
plausible suggestion.  If someone’s existing property has been acquired 
through injustice, then it falls under what Aristotle calls corrective justice to 
restore that property or an appropriately equivalent value to the victim of the 
injustice.  If the property has not been acquired unjustly, there is no question 
to be asked about the distributive justice of its possession. Aristotle applies the 
notion of distributive justice primarily to acts of distributing some unallocated 
goods.  Yet the argument of Book II in favor of private property is, in effect, 
an argument against regarding property as a common asset to be distributed 
and redistributed directly by the city.  Questions of justice arise instead about 
the use of the property.  Its use falls under the general conception of justice as 
lawfulness, and in particular under that part of it which is constituted by the 
other-regarding dimensions of generosity.  People should use their wealth for 
the common good of the city as well as for the good of their closer friends and 
relatives.   
The use of property might even fall under the scope of specifically 
distributive justice to the extent that it is guided by considerations of merit.  
As Garver helpfully observes, Aristotle’s conception of merit in the 
distribution of political authority is forward-looking rather than backward-
looking; a person merits a share of authority proportionate to the good he can 
do with it, not in proportion to what he has already done (p. 90).  There is 
reason to think that Aristotle regards forward-looking considerations as 
relevant to the distribution of property as well.  According to Book II, the 
Carthaginians make wealth and virtue jointly necessary for holding office on 
the grounds that ruling well requires leisure from work and freedom from 
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financial need, and hence is possible only for the wealthy.   Aristotle responds 
that they ought to adopt measures to ensure that those with the requisite virtue 
will have the requisite property (II.11, 1273a22-35).  Whether or not these 
considerations strictly amount to considerations of distributive justice, it is 
plain that both the distribution and the use of property fall under the broader 
concept of justice as lawfulness.  While this makes for intriguing differences 
with modern ideas of distributive justice, it is misleading at best to claim that 
the Politics treats the use of property “not as a question of justice at all” (p. 
54).   
Justice as lawfulness also plays a crucial role in Books VII-VIII 
because the argument gives a fundamental role to the value of justice for the 
just agent.  Ruling others despotically, subjecting their interests to one’s own 
and denying them a role in the deliberation and decision-making that govern 
their lives, is ignoble and hence bad for the person who does it (VII.3, 
1325a16-b23).  Justice comes into play here not only insofar as concern for 
the common good guides the design of political institutions, but insofar as 
seeking to live with others on terms of equality and mutual benefit is itself a 
component of a good life.  Aristotle is thus able to show that distinctively 
political rule can be of value to both the ruler and the ruled, because it aims at 
the common good of a community of equals, creating and sustaining the 
conditions in which each of those members is best able to flourish.   
Garver writes eloquently about this dimension of Aristotle’s 
argument (pp. 188-90), and he is right that we can appreciate this point and 
bring it to bear on practical deliberation in non-ideal contexts without 
accepting any of the institutional arrangements that Books VII-VIII go on to 
endorse.  But he overstates the gap between the defense of political rule and 
the elaboration of the institutional structure of the best constitution.  The value 
of ruling politically is only one part of the good life that those institutions are 
designed to promote.  The best constitution will enable and encourage all of 
its citizens to live in a way that expresses their intellectual, emotional, and 
practical capacities in a robust and integrated fashion.  Political rule is crucial 
for realizing this goal, but it is neither the whole nor even the primary part of 
it.  That distinction goes instead to the leisured pursuits of literary and artistic 
culture.  Garver observes that Aristotle does not endorse a public program of 
education designed to foster this culture outside of Books VII-VIII.  But the 
thick conception of the good life that is the aim of the best constitution may 
allow utopian theorizing to be more practical than he takes it to be.  
In the real world, efforts at political improvement are constrained by 
the demands of stability.  Stability is by no means sufficient for a good 
constitution, but it is necessary; a city beset by destabilizing conflict is unable 
to achieve the common good.  Among the conditions imposing limitations on 
improvement is the existence of a plurality of conceptions of the good.  Many 
people prefer the pursuit of pleasure, freedom, wealth, or domination to the 
life of intellectual and practical excellence.  Unlike many liberal thinkers, 
Aristotle does not regard these alternative views as reasonable or inherently 
worthy of respect, and he supposes that political authority may rightly seek to 
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shape citizens’ character and even compel them to act in accordance with the 
demands of virtue.  But he does not naively advocate coercive moral 
education as a viable solution to the problem.  One of the statesman’s tasks is 
“to introduce an arrangement of such a sort that people will easily be 
persuaded and be able to share in” (IV.1, 1289a2-4).  Stability and justice both 
require that the citizens be persuaded to support the constitution willingly, and 
not merely compelled.  
Typically, the statesman cannot simply implement the institutions of 
the best constitution, even gradually, because neither persuasion nor coercion 
will successfully bring the citizens to support them adequately.  It does not 
follow, however, that there is no sense in which the best constitution provides 
a model for approximation.  To promote the common good is not to promote 
what the citizens take to be good, but what is actually good for them.  The 
account of the best constitution is supposed to show us what the full 
achievement of that task would look like.  As such, it can guide judgment and 
decision in non-ideal contexts without supplying a recipe for its achievement 
or a set of institutional means that can produce the desired end equally well in 
any context.  To borrow Aristotle’s medical analogy, a theoretical model of 
perfect bodily health can guide medical practice even when the best 
achievable falls far below the best without qualification.  Ultimately, it is only 
by relation to the best without qualification that we can identify which sub-
optimal alternatives to prefer.  
 Garver seems to acknowledge this much when he writes that “much 
of the interest in the Politics, especially in Books IV-VI, comes in seeing 
Aristotle develop political forms of moderation that insure stability and at the 
same time move the constitution as close as possible to promoting the good 
life, so that aiming at stability does not become an amoral variant on raison 
d’etat” (p. 224).  But surely understanding what the good life is and the 
principles of justice embodied in the best constitution can help guide our 
reforms of existing constitutions not by giving us policy proposals for gradual 
implementation, but by showing us what a fortunate city aimed at promoting a 
correct conception of the common good would look like.  Like a good 
physician, the statesman can aim to approximate the model’s achievement of 
the goal without imitating its means of achieving it.
3
  Ideal theory thereby has 
more practical relevance than simply reminding us that politics is worthwhile 
even in dismal circumstances.
4
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3 For a similar understanding of what he calls Aristotle’s “gradual approximism,” see 
Fred D. Miller, Jr., “Aristotelian Statecraft and Modern Politics,” in Aristotle’s Politics 
Today, ed. Lenn E. Goodman and Robert B. Talisse (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 2008), pp. 13-32. 
 
4 I am grateful to Eugene Garver for comments on a draft of this review.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
